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The Populist Lock 
 









 The author attempts to explain the fall of the Serbian ruler Slobodan 
Milošević in October 2000. Milošević’s system of power can be analyzed as a re-
gime with sultanistic tendencies, a dictatorial system based on direct control of 
power by the ruler, his family and the staff recruited upon personal loyalty. Al-
though activities of the opposition were seriously restricted and the elections were 
neither free nor fair, the regime could not completely do away with the opposition 
and elections. Milošević’s regime relied on electoral mobilization of popular sup-
port. At the same time it used a wide range of instruments of electoral manipula-
tion. When Milošević decided to organize presidential elections one year before 
the end of his term, he didn’t calculate with two factors: rapid decline of his le-
gitimacy as result of NATO air strikes against Serbia, and the ability of the Ser-
bian opposition to overcome its fragmentation and unite behind Koštunica as the 
presidential candidate. Electoral support for Koštunica ultimately exceeded so 
significantly the support for Milošević that it couldn’t be counterbalanced by any 
manipulation. Thus Milošević became victim of the populist method of rule by 
which he came to power. 
 
1. 
 The first approach that can be taken to explain the fall of Slobodan Milošević, the 
ruler who dominated Serbia in the last 13 years, is of a sociological kind. Milošević fell 
because his policy lost support among electorates long before the September elections. 
At previous Federal elections in 1996 the ruling coalition composed of the Socialist 
party of Serbia (SPS), the Yugoslav United Left (YUL) and the Serbian Radical Party 
(SRP) won 64 percent of the votes and controlled the lower chamber of the Federal par-
liament with the majority of 82 seats out of 108. At the 1997 Serbian parliamentary 
elections the same ruling coalition won 62.3 percent of the votes, which was translated 
into 192 out of 250 seats in the parliament. At the last elections held on September 
2000, the Left coalition (SPS and YUL) won 31.8 percent of the ballots cast, gaining 44 
seats in the lower chamber of the Federal parliament, while SRP obtained 8.4 percent of 
the ballots, or 5 seats. 
 The trend behind the decrease of Milošević’s popularity was first captured by a re-
search team supported by the Center for Policy Studies from Belgrade shortly after the 
end of NATO strikes in June 1999. Between September 1999 and September 2000, the 
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center conducted four comprehensive public opinion surveys, all of which pointed to the 
same conclusion: the citizens of Serbia were fed up with ethnic nationalism and national 
rhetoric. The evidence of this was the fact that the Kosovo question—the most compel-
ling form of the Serbian national question that has ever dominated  contemporary Ser-
bian politics—became neglected within months after the end of the war with NATO. In 
a research conducted in early July of 2000, 10 percent of the Serbian people considered 
the Kosovo question to be the most important one. In September of 2000, only 4 percent 
of the people expressed the same opinion, a clear indication that the thirteen years of 
exploiting national rhetoric had lost its appeal among Serbs. The suggestion made by 
the public opinion surveys was that anyone who wanted to base their policy on the na-
tionalistic rhetoric was bound to lose. 
 Sociologists will certainly have more to say about this aspect of Milošević’s fall in 
the future. In this article, however, I would like to focus on the regime’s preconditions 
of Milošević’s fall. The article is organized in the following way. Section 2 explains the 
change that occurred within the Serbian opposition shortly before the September elec-
tions and how this change facilitated its success. Section 3 classifies the Milošević re-
gime as a regime with sultanist tendencies. Here I argue that the key cause of 
Milošević’s fall was his inability to scrap the electoral institutions. Finally, section 4 
advances the populist lock thesis to explain the reasons that drove Milošević to go for 
direct presidential elections. 
 
2. 
 Until only a few months before the September elections, the Serbian opposition was 
the worst in Europe. In the past ten years all European countries had seen at least once 
change of government. Only in Serbia this did not happen. One of the reasons for the 
Serbian opposition’s meager results was the issue of its leadership. Vuk Drašković, the 
leader of the largest Serbian opposition party, the Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM), 
had been blackmailing the rest of the opposition throughout the past decade, insisting 
that the opposition may unite only under his leadership and only if the SRM had a 
dominant role. This led to the disintegration of the opposition coalition called “Zajedno” 
(“Together”) in the spring of 1997, in spite of its success in the November 1996 mu-
nicipal elections. One of the consequences of the coalition’s collapse was that one of the  
opposition parties, Zoran Đinđić’s Democratic Party (DP), decided to boycott the 1997 
elections, while another opposition party, Drašković’s SRM, decided to take part. The 
opposition split over the question of its presidential candidate, which enabled 
Milošević’s coalition to win the presidential and the parliamentary elections and thus 
marginalize the opposition in the next three years. Constantly in disarray and divided 
over the question of leadership, the Serbian opposition often acted as a pillar of 
Milošević’s regime rather than a real alternative to it. 
 During the summer of 2000 the issue of leadership was unexpectedly taken off the 
agenda. Zoran Đinđić, the DP leader, contributed to this the most. The events took an 
unforeseen turn when Đinđić publicly declared in July that the opposition’s presidential 
candidate, behind whom everyone could throw their weight, could be Vojislav 
Koštunica, the leader of a small opposition party, which won only 5.1 percent of the 
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votes in the 1993 elections. Đinđić’s willingness to play second fiddle in the opposition 
(he took the role of the opposition’s campaign manager) meant that the opposition 
would no longer waste time and energy on discussing its leadership and organizational 
matters. This came as a surprise since Đinđić’s DP was larger and stronger than 
Koštunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS); also, the DP was the axis of the popular 
opposition coalition “Alliance for Change” formed in 1999; and finally, Đinđić himself 
could claim credit for reviving the activity of the opposition after the NATO strikes 
during which the opposition appeared to be defunct. What Vuk Drašković had never 
done before, Đinđić adopted as his guiding principle: he stepped aside and let Koštunica 
run for president. At that moment it became clear that the opposition organized itself 
around one goal—to beat Milošević and change the regime. The other segment of the 
opposition, Vuk Drašković’s SRM, which continued to function on the old principles, 
throughout the election campaign was hurling accusations against the other segment of 
the opposition by saying it had made “a catastrophic mistake for not having decided to 
accept the leadership of the biggest and the strongest opposition party.” As a result, the 
SRM presidential candidate Vojislav Mihajlović won only 2.95 percent of the votes in 
the last September elections, while the SRM won 4.9 percent of the votes and remained 
without a deputy in the lower chamber. 
 
3. 
 During the last several years of its existence, Milošević’s regime started to show sul-
tanist tendencies. Sultanism is a type of an authoritarian system based on political mo-
nopoly. At the top of the system there is a person or a family surrounded by obedient 
aides appointed solely for their loyalty to the sultan. The sultan and his cronies aim at 
the material exploitation of the nation for personal material gains. “As a result, corrup-
tion reigns supreme at all levels of society” (Linz & Chechabi, 1998:7). However, 
Milošević’s regime was not a full-blown form of sultanism, but rather a regime with 
sultanist tendencies. Two elements of Milošević’s regime did not fit into the ideal sul-
tanist type. No form of sultanism permits either free elections or the existence of a real 
opposition. The opposition in sultanism is phony and loyal to the regime, while elec-
tions are a mere show where the winner is known in advance (ibid., 18, 20). Milošević’s 
regime started moving in this direction in 1992 when Vojislav Šešelj’s SRP became the 
fake opposition. In 1993, this role was given to a small party called the New Democ-
racy, led by Dušan Mihajlović who, for the sake of a few cabinet chairs sold out to 
Milošević and gave him another four years in power. In 1997, this role was taken up by 
Drašković’s SRM, which in return received the help of Milošević’s SPS to hold on to 
power in the Belgrade city hall. Had Milošević managed to survive few more years in 
power, the regime would have probably managed to corrupt the entire opposition, and 
thereby transform itself into a developed form of sultanism. But the democratic opposi-
tion managed to come up with Vojislav Koštunica who had never made any deals with 
Milošević in the past. In this sense, he could present himself as “the clean hands of the 
Serbian opposition” in which the Serbian electorate saw a real alternative to Milošević. 
 Also, Milošević never succeeded in bringing to a standstill the electoral process. In 
this respect Serbia was similar to Slovakia under Vladimir Mečiar. Stephen Fish argued 
that Mečiar never succeeded in totally closing the polity and doing away with free elec-
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tions. This contributed to his fall in October 1998 (Fish, 1999: 50-1). Due to this, Fish 
classified Mečiar’s regime as a specific kind of authoritarian regimes, different from 
sultanism. I want to argue that there is yet another sub-type of authoritarian regimes that 
can be placed between Mečiarism and sultanism. Serbia under Milošević was an em-
bodiment of this sub-type. Milošević’s undeveloped form of sultanism differed from 
Mečiarism in that it was economically isolated. (Serbia had been under the economic 
sanctions imposed by the international community since 1992.) The two regimes were 
similar in their inability to carry out a total clampdown on the electoral process.  
 Just like Mečiar, Milošević was doing everything he could to obstruct free elections. 
The most blatant electoral engineering occurred in Kosovo where about 1 million Alba-
nians regularly boycotted Serbian elections. Milošević’s lackey Milan Milutinović, ran 
in 1998 for the Serbian presidency and narrowly won over Vojislav Šešelj with the help 
of 200,000 votes from the Kosovo Albanians. This was one of the many instances of 
rigging the elections since the introduction of political pluralism in Serbia in 1990 
(Goati, 1999). In spite of these manipulations, the elections in Serbia were still free in 
the following sense. Democratic elections presuppose a certain level of uncertainty, 
making it possible for the ruling parties to lose elections (Przeworski, 1991: 10-11). In 
sultanism, as in communism, there is no uncertainty and the sultan cannot lose. But 
from the start of the 2000 election campaign until the final results came through, no one 
could predict with certainty the outcome of these elections. Milošević employed all the 
means at his disposal to reduce the opposition’s chances: the police harassed the mem-
bers of the youth organization Otpor as well as the members of other NGOs; 
Milošević’s generals threatened people with using force; his ministers flaunted the 
threats of imprisonment, arrests, court proceedings, and the shut-down of independent 
media houses. The infamous 1998 Public Information Law was invoked 66 times in the 
period between 1998 and 2000, and the total fines collected by this law - paid mainly by 
the independent media -today amounts to half a million dollars. During the campaign, 
both the public and the private radio and television, all under the strict control of 
Milošević’s cronies, covered only the ruling coalition events, labelling the opposition 
and its presidential candidate as traitors and foreign agents who, if elected, would sell 
Serbia to the depraved West for a fistful of dollars. In spite of all these obstacles, the 
united opposition beat the Left coalition with 50 against 32 percent of the votes, 
whereas Koštunica beat Milošević with 50.54 against 38.62 percent. 
 
4. 
 Milošević’s crucial mistake was to run for president and test his grassroot support 
one year earlier. Still, it is not clear why Milošević made this move. In fact, there was 
no legal ground that mandated direct presidential elections, let alone the early ones. 
Milošević was elected for the Federal president by the Federal parliament in July 1997 
for a four-year term. The 1992 Federal constitution stipulates that the president is 
elected and can be impeached only by the parliament if found guilty of breaching the 
constitution (Articles 78, 97). Although Milošević’s presidential mandate was to expire 
only in July 2001 without the possibility for another mandate, on 6 July  2000 Milošević 
influenced the ruling coalition’s federal MPs into amending the constitution in order to 
enable him to seek a re-election. The new amendment V stipulates that the federal 
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president is to be elected by a direct ballot. But why did Milošević want to be elected di-
rectly? It was more prudent not to touch the part of the electoral scheme concerning the 
election of presidents and wait for the parliamentary re-election coming in July 2001. In 
this case, the result of the 2000 elections would be an even stronger Milošević, backed 
by the strong parliamentary majority. (YUL won 44 and its Montenegrin counterpart 30 
seats, which makes a majority of 74 out of 138.) However, Milošević insisted on run-
ning for president directly. There are two reasons that may explain this move. 
 The first reason has to do with the opposition. I argued in section 2 that the Serbian 
opposition, constantly split over the question of leadership, often acted as a pillar of 
Milošević’s regime. Milošević’s decision to run for president was predicated on the as-
sumption that the opposition would remain disunited and disorganized. He rightly ex-
pected that it would not manage to rally behind one counter-candidate. Moreover, when 
the presidential elections were announced on July 27, the opposition was taken aback, 
as it was preparing itself only for the municipal and parliamentary elections and not for 
an abruptly announced presidential elections. Milošević expected the opposition to split 
over the question of participation in these elections. Drašković’s SRM confirmed this 
premise. This party—which in the summer of 2000 was still perceived as the largest op-
position party; it had won 19.1 percent of the votes on the 1997 elections—declared its 
electoral boycott. When the rest of the opposition nevertheless put up Vojislav 
Koštunica, SRM put up its own candidate for presidency. This kind of split within the 
opposition was precisely what Milošević had hoped for. With the opposition divided 
and with the opposition’s two candidates, Milošević’s decision to run for president at 
the beginning of summer seemed a perfectly sound idea. However, what Milošević 
never expected was that a major portion  of the opposition managed without much in-
fighting and bickering to agree on a joint candidate. The agreement was reached by con-
sensus rather than by the traditional domination of the biggest party. If Milošević had 
outfoxed the opposition with the constitutional changes of 6 July, the democratic oppo-
sition surely outfoxed Milošević by settling on Koštunica as the joint presidential candidate. 
 The second reason why Milošević wanted direct elections is related to the way he 
came to power in 1987-1989. Milošević’s first coming to power can be divided into two 
stages. First, Milošević took over the control of the Serbian Communist Party in 1987 
and purged it from all the people who showed even the slightest signs of disobedience. 
Since the communist party controlled the main pillars of economic life, Milošević also 
purged the key economic positions and installed obedient people. However, he could 
not become the true ruler of Serbia if not confirmed by the masses. Thus, the second 
phase consists of a series of mass demonstrations that took place in 1988 and 1989 all 
over Serbia. More than 4 million people took part in these mass rallies, the last of which 
pompously took place on 28 June 1989 on Kosovo, celebrating the 600th anniversary of 
the Kosovo battle; 2 million people attended. These events, spurred by populist refer-
enda, catapulted Milošević onto the Serbian throne. 
 Once sanctioned by the masses, Milošević could not escape popular election in the 
future. The communist Serbian parliament adopted in 1990 a new constitution stipulat-
ing direct presidential elections as well as direct presidential impeachment (Articles 86, 
88). In contrast, the federal parliament, although composed similarly like the Serbian 
parliament, adopted in 1992 a new federal constitution stipulating that the federal presi-
 
Pavlović, D., The Populist Lock, Politička misao, Vol. XXXVII, (2000), No. 5, pp. 122–127 127 
                                                                                                                                              
dent is to be elected by the federal parliament and not by direct ballot. This difference 
can be accounted for by the fact that Milošević intended to become Serbian president by 
deriving legitimacy from the 1988/9 mass events. No other politician was allowed to 
seek and obtain legitimacy conferred by direct elections. When Milošević moved from 
the post of Serbian president to become Federal president in 1997, he immediately 
called for the amendment of article 97. This attempt was torpedoed by the Montenegrin 
federal deputies led by Milo Đukanović, who then still attended the federal assembly 
sessions. Three years later, with the Montenegrin ruling coalition’s federal deputies not 
sitting in the federal assembly anymore, Milošević easily pushed through the constitu-
tional amendments mandating direct elections. 
 Milošević wanted to repeat over and over again the “election” of 1988/9 because 
this was the only way to sustain the aura  the mass rallies created around him. The crux 
of the populist lock thesis is that he found himself  “locked” into the populist way of 
political promotion by which he began his political career. (Hence the term “populist 
lock.”) The two presidential elections of 1990 and 1992 sustained his charisma in his 
own eyes and in those of many Serbs. Without direct elections, Serbs would have 
sooner realized what Milošević really was: a former communist party apparatchik and a 
third-rate banker with a strong affinity for corruption. And the Serbian transition to de-
mocracy would have started earlier. 
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